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Infrastructure projects such as repositories for nuclear waste or hazardous waste
sites impose risks (in the form of potential burdens or losses) over extensive
timescales. These risks change dynamically over time and so, potentially, does
their management. Societies and key actors go through learning processes and
subsequently may be better able to deal with related challenges. However, social
scientiﬁc research on the acceptance of such projects is mainly concerned with
(static) risk perception issues and does not include dynamic aspects. Adaptive
capacity, which is part of the concept of vulnerability, therefore represents a
promising complementing facet for this line of research. The aim of this paper is
to examine the role of perceived adaptive capacity (PAC) for the acceptance of
contested long-term infrastructure for the two issues of nuclear and hazardous
waste. In an online experimental survey (N = 300) examining either the accep-
tance of a nuclear waste repository or of a hazardous waste site, we demonstrate
that (i) PAC can be separated empirically as a psychological construct from risk
and beneﬁt perception, and (ii) PAC explains a signiﬁcant additional share of
variance in the acceptance of both waste types beyond risk and beneﬁt percep-
tion. Furthermore, we report what adaptation mechanisms of PAC participants
expect to occur in the future. We conclude that such a dynamic perspective
yields important insights in understanding individual decision-making regarding
long-term infrastructure projects.
Keywords: perceived adaptive capacity; risk perception; vulnerability; accep-
tance of contested infrastructure; nuclear waste; hazardous waste
Introduction
In the siting of large infrastructure projects such as nuclear power plants, nuclear
waste repositories, dams, wind power plants, deep geothermal, or carbon capture
and storage (CCS) implementers often face enormous difﬁculties. Such projects, also
referred to as contested infrastructure (Boholm 2004), share some common charac-
teristics: they are often large-scale projects in which burdens and beneﬁts are
unequally distributed over time and space, and they include a broad range of actors
with differing interests and values. Moreover, these infrastructures often pose risks
over very long timescales due to uncertainties in physical processes and knowledge
(ignorance). In a nutshell, they ‘combine technical factors and social factors in
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complex multi-attribute trade-offs’ (Reiner and Nuttall 2011, 312). Considering the
difﬁculties in siting such contested infrastructure projects, understanding individual
and societal decision-making is crucial.
One example of such contested infrastructure projects is the issue of nuclear
waste disposal. Repositories for nuclear waste entail all the above-mentioned charac-
teristics and, in particular, long timescales are highly salient (Svenson and Karlsson
1989; Drottz-Sjöberg 2010; Moser et al. 2012). Technical experts are considering
timescales of up to one million years for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste
and spent fuel (Nagra 2002). The risks of such a repository change dynamically
within this timescale. For example, while the radiotoxicity of the waste decreases
over time due to radioactive decay, the canisters containing the spent fuel or vitriﬁed
high-level wastes will become ever more likely to leak due to corrosion (Nagra
2002). Furthermore, the societies responsible for managing these risks also change.
New technologies or learning processes in general may provide future societies with
better knowledge on how to deal with the risks. On the other hand, relevant knowl-
edge could also be lost over time, thus impairing future societies’ successful risk
management. This example demonstrates that a dynamic perspective on technical
and societal systems is crucial for understanding decisions about nuclear waste dis-
posal and probably other contested infrastructure projects as well. This also
appraises the capability of the system exposed to negative outcomes to cope with
these.
However, current social scientiﬁc research examining the acceptance of contested
infrastructure does not take such a dynamic view but predominantly focuses on the
perception of risks (e.g. Bord and O’Connor 1992; Chung and Kim 2009;
Drottz-Sjöberg 2010, Seidl et al. 2013). This static view can be found both with
pure risk and speculative risk (Fishburn 1982; Scholz and Siegrist 2010), the former
referring to only potential negative outcomes, the latter to potential positive as well
as potential negative outcomes. We use in the following for the valuation on the
negative aspects the term ‘risk perception’ (RP) as it is given by pure risk, and for
positive aspects the term ‘beneﬁt perception’ (BP) (see e.g. Fischhoff et al. 1978;
Finucane et al. 2000; Slovic et al. 2004; Siegrist, Gutscher, and Earle 2005). The
mentioned static view is also reﬂected on the level of item construction in RP
questionnaires. In some studies, participants are asked to judge the overall risks
emerging from an issue, others ask participants to judge probabilities and outcomes
of negative events, or participants are asked to judge risks for humans and for the
environment separately (nuclear waste: Stauffacher, Krütli, and Scholz, 2008;
Sjöberg and Drottz-Sjöberg 2009; nuclear power: Whitﬁeld et al. 2009; waste incin-
eration: Lima 2004; environmental risks: Böhm and Pﬁster 2005). Hence, the RP
items used in currently published studies relate to risks as a static construct and do
not take into consideration the aforementioned dynamic aspects of long-term risks.
Scholz, Blumer, and Brand (2012) demonstrate that vulnerability judgments may
be understood as including a dynamic management potential. Vulnerability is
usually conceived as a function of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity
(McCarthy et al. 2001; Adger 2006; Smit and Wandel 2006). According to Scholz,
Blumer, and Brand (2012), adaptive capacity is the supplementary aspect involved
in vulnerability, which is not inherent in common notions of risk. Adaptation may
occur as a response to or in anticipation of a negative event related to a perceived
risk or threat. These events or threats may take the form of a discrete extreme event,
(temporal) variability of state variables, or long-term changes (Smit et al. 1999).
Journal of Risk Research 623
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The scientiﬁc use of adaptation has been ﬁrst established in evolutionary biology
and ‘refers to the development of genetic or behavioral characteristics which enable
organisms or systems to cope with environmental changes in order to survive and
reproduce’ (Smit and Wandel 2006, 283). At the societal level, adaptation can be
conceived as ‘a process, action or outcome in a system (household, community,
group, sector, region, country) in order for the system to better cope with, manage
or adjust to some changing condition, stress, hazard, risk or opportunity’ (Smit and
Wandel 2006, 282). In other words, adaptive capacity refers to a system’s ability to
maintain its function in case of disturbance (i.e. negative events related to threats)
but also to its capacity to reorganize in order to deal with challenges (Folke 2006).
Key aspects of adaptive capacity on a societal level thus comprise learning,
innovation, and technological development. In other words, adaptive capacity can be
considered a highly relevant component in the process of realizing resilient
human-environment systems (Scholz 2011). Such systems are – amongst other
things – better able to deal with negative future impacts caused by infrastructure
projects. One can distinguish between (supposedly) objective adaptive capacity
(e.g. time, money, staying power, knowledge, entitlements, social and institutional
support, see Grothmann and Patt 2005) and (more subjective) perceived adaptive
capacity (PAC), i.e. judgments on how well individuals or societies are expected to
be able to cope with negative events and developments. Particularly when extensive
timescales are considered, it is important to distinguish between these two types:
actual technological development (objective adaptive capacity) might, for example,
not keep up with what a technologically optimistic person expects for the future
(PAC). PAC therefore yields important insights into people’s expectations of coping
with future developments and could take on the function of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy
in triggering or re-enforcing those expectations over time and converting them into
action.
A considerable body of empirical or conceptual studies regarding adaptive
capacity is focused on climate change (e.g. Smit et al. 1999; McCarthy et al. 2001;
Grothmann and Patt 2005; Alberini, Chiabai, and Muehlenbachs 2006; Smit and
Wandel 2006; Kuruppu and Liverman 2011). With respect to other long-term risks,
such as nuclear or hazardous waste disposal, perceived risks have received a great
deal of attention in social scientiﬁc studies. However, none of these studies accounts
for PAC.
Smit et al. (1999) suggest that studies on adaptation should clarify the following
questions: (1) Adaptation to what? (2) who adapts? and (3) what kind of adaptations
are considered? The focus of this study lies on adaptation toward potential threats
represented by contested infrastructures. Individuals today are asked about the
expected adaptation of future societies to these threats by learning processes and
technological progress. In other words, we look at how individuals currently per-
ceive the adaptive capacity of future societies, how this perception affects their
acceptance of contested infrastructure projects today, and what mechanisms of adap-
tive capacity they expect to occur in the future. While PAC refers to a general judg-
ment about the ability of future societies to adapt to challenges, the related
mechanisms describe speciﬁc processes that may be involved in coping with the
negative outcomes/events that are related to a speciﬁc risk. They provide more
details into what adaptive capacity might mean more concretely, why people believe
that future societies are able adapting, i.e. they describe processes that hinder or
promote adaptive capacity of future societies (effective crisis management system,
624 C. Moser et al.
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technological progress, change of individual behavior, political and economical
crises, loss of relevant knowledge).
We take nuclear waste and hazardous waste as examples. As outlined above,
nuclear waste disposal can be considered a prototype of contested and stigmatized
infrastructure projects, with a large body of research examining decision and site
selection processes (e.g. NRC 2003; Strandberg and Andrén 2009; Krütli et al.
2010a, 2012). As a second issue, we examine hazardous waste to better understand
whether nuclear waste is a special case or if our insights potentially also apply to
other contested infrastructure projects. Switzerland does not have a deep geological
repository for nuclear waste yet; wastes are currently stored in the nuclear power
plants or in a central interim storage. After plans for a nuclear waste repository in
central Switzerland failed due to local resistance and two negative votes in local ref-
erenda (Flüeler 2006; Krütli et al. 2010a), the Swiss Federal Ofﬁce of Energy
(SFOE) initiated a sectoral plan to guide a participatory stepwise decision process to
select sites for a repository in Switzerland (SFOE 2008). In contrast, hazardous
waste sites do exist in Switzerland. One well-known example is Kölliken, a hazard-
ous waste landﬁll that opened in 1978. Due to leakage, this site has to be cleaned up
at very high costs (Flüeler 2010). Both waste types impose a risk for humans and
the environment over extensive timescales. Important differences between both
waste types refer to the volumes. In Switzerland, 100,000–200,000 t of hazardous
waste are produced per year compared to 100,000 t of nuclear waste for a time per-
iod of 60 years (about 3000 t of that are high-level waste). Furthermore, nuclear
waste in Switzerland contains only few and well-characterized pollutants whose
impacts are known in detail (apart from very low doses whose impacts are currently
investigated scientiﬁcally). In contrast, hazardous waste can be characterized by a
multitude of interacting pollutants, whose impacts are only partly known (Flüeler
2010).
The main aim of this paper is to examine the role of perceived adaptive capacity
(PAC) for the acceptance of contested infrastructure for the two issues of nuclear
waste and hazardous waste. More speciﬁcally, we aim at testing whether PAC can
explain an additional share of variance in acceptance of the infrastructure projects
that cannot be explained by RP and BP alone. Furthermore, we aim at describing
the construct of adaptive capacity in more detail with respect to its adaptation mech-
anisms for the issues of nuclear waste and hazardous waste. The following research
questions form the core of our investigation:
 Do RP, BP, and PAC of the issues of nuclear waste and hazardous waste repre-
sent different psychological constructs?
 What is the role of PAC in the acceptance of contested infrastructure such as
nuclear waste and hazardous waste?
 What mechanisms of adaptive capacity do people today expect to develop in
the future with respect to negative consequences of nuclear waste or hazardous
waste?
Our research thereby aims to a contribution to the further development of RP
research by including a future-oriented perspective, or to express it in other terms, to
extend or transfer the static risk concept towards the notion of vulnerability.
Journal of Risk Research 625
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Method
Design of the experimental survey
Manipulated variable
Waste type. We examined the role of PAC in acceptance for either a nuclear waste
repository or for a hazardous waste site. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of these two conditions and received a short description of the respective issue
before responding to the variables of interest. Descriptions for both waste types are
taken from Moser et al. (2013, see Appendix 1).
Measured variables
RP (scale). The scale measuring RP of a nuclear waste repository (adapted from
Stauffacher, Krütli, and Scholz 2008) consisted of seven items referring to risks
associated with a nuclear waste repository (e.g. transport accidents, health risks,
environmental risks, release of radioactivity into groundwater, and economic risks).
This scale was slightly adapted for the issue of hazardous waste (see Table 3, items
RP for the full list of items). Participants judged how strongly they associated a
nuclear waste repository (or a hazardous waste site) with these risks on a seven-
point scale, while one indicated ‘not at all’ and seven ‘very strongly’. The calculated
scale had very good reliability: Cronbach’s α = 0.90.
BP (scale). The scale measuring BP (adapted from Stauffacher, Krütli, and Scholz
2008) consisted of ﬁve items with beneﬁts associated with a nuclear waste reposi-
tory or a hazardous waste site (e.g. additional jobs, tax reduction, and improvement
of regional infrastructure). The identical scale was used for both waste groups (see
Table 3, items BP for the full list of items). Participants judged how strongly they
associated a nuclear waste repository (or a hazardous waste site) with these potential
beneﬁts on a seven-point scale, while one indicated ‘not at all’ and seven ‘very
strongly’. The calculated scale had good reliability: Cronbach’s α = 0.81.
PAC (scale). To our knowledge, an established scale measuring PAC for threats posed
by contested infrastructure does not yet exist. We informed participants that the safety
of a nuclear waste repository or hazardous waste site has top priority in Switzerland,
but that at the same time no one can guarantee 100% safety. Afterwards, participants
judged how well the society would be able to manage several potential negative con-
sequences of a nuclear waste repository or hazardous waste site. Referring to the used
RP items, we chose the following four potentially negative consequences of a nuclear
waste repository (in parentheses for hazardous waste site: (i) release of radioactivity
(toxic material) into groundwater; (ii) unintentional recovery of the repository
(hazardous waste site) by future generations; (iii) economic losses caused by the
repository (hazardous waste site); and (iv) release of nuclear waste (hazardous waste)
due to a transport accident (see Table 3, items PAC for the full list of items). Partici-
pants judged how well society would be able to manage these situations on a seven-
point scale, where one indicated ‘very badly’ and seven ‘very well’. The calculated
scale had good reliability: Cronbach’s α = 0.84.
Mechanism of adaptive capacity (single processes/items). We developed a list of
items covering different mechanisms of adaptive capacity. It includes three
626 C. Moser et al.
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mechanisms of a successful management (technological progress, individual behav-
ior, and well-organized crisis management) and three mechanisms of an unsuccessful
management (loss of relevant knowledge, economic crisis, and political crisis, see
Table 5 for the list of items). Participants rated these mechanisms on seven-point
scales while one indicated ‘I do not agree at all’ and seven ‘I agree very strongly.’
Acceptance (scale). We measured acceptance of a nuclear waste repository or a haz-
ardous waste disposal site with three items related to different places where the dis-
posal would be built: (i) in Switzerland, (ii) in the region where one lives, and (iii)
one’s own community on a seven-point scale, one indicating ‘I’m strongly opposed’
and seven ‘I’m strongly in favor’. The calculated scale had very good reliability:
Cronbach’s α = .97.
Manipulation check (open-ended question). To check whether the manipulation of
waste type had been successful, participants were asked to write down in a textbox
some examples of wastes they had considered, while answering the questionnaire.
Procedure and participants
Data collection took place in mid-November 2011 (15–17 November 2011). Partici-
pants were all recruited from an online panel. An equal number of males and
females (in total 1000 people) were contacted and invited to participate by email.
After entering the survey by clicking on a link, they were welcomed to the study
and randomly assigned to either the nuclear waste condition or to the hazardous
waste condition. First, participants read a brief description of either nuclear waste or
hazardous waste. The subsequent procedure was similar for both groups: the ﬁrst
group always responded to questions concerning nuclear waste and the second group
always responded to questions concerning hazardous waste. First, they responded to
the RP and BP scales. On the next screen, they answered the PAC items as well as
the items on mechanisms of adaptive capacity. After responding to the acceptance
items on the subsequent page and the manipulation check items, they provided
demographic information. Completion of the whole questionnaire took on average
about 10 min; participants received a small incentive for participation (approxi-
mately 0.60 €). Of the 1000 contacted people, 355 people started the survey within
three days (until quota was full). While 55 participants dropped out, 300 partici-
pants, of them 155 women (51.7%) and 145 men (48.3%) completed the question-
naire and were included in the subsequent statistical analyses. The completion rate
among those 355 people who started the survey is quite high (85%). Participants
live in the German-speaking part of Switzerland; their age ranges between 18 and
69 years (M = 41.6 years, SD = 13.15 years). Seven (2.3%) had completed compul-
sory school, 131 (43.7%) vocational education, 44 (14.7%) senior high school, 36
(12.0%) higher vocational training, 79 (26.4%) went to university, and 3 (1.0%) peo-
ple did not specify their educational level. With respect to living conditions, 87
(29.0%) participants live alone, 12 (4.0%) live in a shared ﬂat, 103 (34.3%) live
with their partner, 95 (31.7%) live in a family with kids, and 3 (1.0%) people did
not specify their living condition. Our sample is approximately representative for
Switzerland’s population with respect to age (Swiss average in 2012: 41.6 years;
BFS 2014a) and gender (49% male and 51% female in 2012; BFS 2014a) as well as
living conditions (BFS 2014b). Our sample included more people with a university
Journal of Risk Research 627
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degree and less people who only ﬁnished compulsory school compared to Switzer-
land’s population (educations levels in Switzerland in 2012: 13.7% compulsory
school, 41.7% vocational training, 8% senior high school, 12.9% higher vocational
training, and 23.7% universities; BFS 2013). These differences are similar as in
postal surveys.
Results
Manipulation check
Participants’ open-ended responses with regard to the waste types they had been
thinking of were coded according to the following scheme: (i) only nuclear, (ii) only
hazardous, (iii) both waste types, or (iv) no response (missing). Table 1 reports the
observed frequencies as well as the corrected standardized residuals of each code
under the two experimental conditions (waste types). There was a signiﬁcant associ-
ation between experimental conditions and assigned manipulation check code:
v2ð3Þ ¼ 73:62; p\:001. Participants in the nuclear waste condition were more
likely to mention nuclear waste only and participants in the hazardous waste condi-
tion were more likely to mention hazardous waste only, thus indicating that our
manipulation had been successful. However, for the interpretation of the subsequent
results, it is important to note that participants in the hazardous waste condition
mentioned a broader spectrum of waste types. They were also more likely to men-
tion both waste types.
PAC as a separate psychological construct
As a ﬁrst step in analysis, we explored whether RP, BP, and PAC each represent dif-
ferent psychological constructs. We performed a principal component analysis
(PCA) including all items of RP, BP, and PAC. According to the Kaiser criterion
and to the visual inspection of the Scree-Plot, a three-factor solution is recom-
mended, explaining 63.3% of the total variance. The result of the PCA indicates that
RP, BP, and PAC can be considered as three separate psychological constructs (see
Table 2). The factor RP explains 27.5% of variance, BP explains 18.2% of variance,
and PAC explains 17.6% of variance.
Table 3 displays the mean values of RP, BP, PAC, and acceptance for both
nuclear waste and hazardous waste for the total sample. Examining the total sample
indicates that the mean RP of both waste types is not signiﬁcantly different from
each other, tð283:07Þ ¼ 0:29; p ¼ :77; r ¼ :02: (two-tailed). Acceptance of a
nuclear waste repository is lower than acceptance of a hazardous waste site, but this
Table 1. Observed frequencies and corrected standardized residuals (in parentheses) of
assigned manipulation check codes by experimental condition N = 300; nnuclear = 147;
nhazardous = 153.
Assigned manipulation check code
(i) Nuclear (ii) Hazardous (iii) Both
(iv) No
response Total
Conditions Nuclear waste 87 (7.4) 12 (–3.4) 21 (–6.3) 33 (1.3) 153
Hazardous waste 23 (–7.4) 32 (3.4) 69 (6.3) 23 (–1.3) 147
Total 110 44 90 56 300
628 C. Moser et al.
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difference in means is not statistically signiﬁcant, tð298Þ ¼ 1:92; p ¼ :06; r ¼ :11:
(two-tailed). Furthermore, participants perceive signiﬁcantly fewer beneﬁts,
tð298Þ ¼ 2:63; p\:01; r ¼ :15 (two-tailed) and less adaptive capacity
tð298Þ ¼ 2:73; p\:01; r ¼ :16 (two-tailed) in the nuclear waste condition com-
pared to those of the hazardous waste condition. Due to the relatively large sample
size, it is important to consider the effect sizes r (according to Rosnow and
Rosenthal 2003), which are all rather small.
Table 2. Items assumed to measure RP, BP and PAC. Parentheses indicate changes made
for the hazardous waste condition. Factor loadings (after Varimax Rotation) and communality
(h2); bold factor loadings indicate the items corresponding to the respective factor N = 300.
Factor loadings
Items
Factor 1
risk
perception
Factor 2
beneﬁt
perception
Factor 3
perceived
adaptive
capacity h2
(RP) Release of nuclear waste (hazardous
waste) in transport accidents
0.72 −0.14 −0.14 0.56
(RP) Health risks for yourself 0.79 −0.14 −0.19 0.68
(RP) Health risks for future generations 0.83 −0.17 −0.17 0.75
(RP) Damage of the environment because of
the repository (hazardous waste site)
0.82 −0.22 −0.15 0.75
(RP) Release of nuclear materials (toxic
materials) into groundwater due to leakage of
a container
0.80 −0.17 −0.02 0.67
(RP) Unintentional recovery of the repository
(hazardous waste site) by future generations
0.73 −0.09 −0.18 0.58
(RP) Economic losses because of image loss in
the region
0.66 −0.04 −0.24 0.49
(BP) Establishment of additional workplaces −0.25 0.70 0.13 0.57
(BP) Advancement of regional infrastructure −0.18 0.74 0.16 0.61
(BP) Lower taxes for residents −0.04 0.74 −0.05 0.55
(BP) Economic impulses for local businesses −0.17 0.80 0.09 0.68
(BP) Promotion of sustainability projects in the
region
−0.08 0.66 0.10 0.46
(PAC) In transport accidents, nuclear waste
(hazardous waste) is released
−0.17 0.18 0.81 0.72
(PAC) Due to leakage of a container, nuclear
materials (toxic materials) are released into
groundwater
−0.15 0.17 0.86 0.79
(PAC) The repository (waste site) has been
recovered unintentionally by future
generations
−0.23 0.13 0.82 0.74
(PAC) The region suffers from economic losses
because of image loss
−0.18 −0.05 0.70 0.53
Notes: Question for RP and BP items reads: ‘How strongly do you associate a nuclear waste repository
(or a hazardous waste site) with these issues?’ Responses were given on a seven-point scale while one
indicated ‘not at all’ and seven ‘very strongly’. Question for PAC items reads: ‘Safety of a nuclear waste
repository (or hazardous waste site) has top priority in Switzerland, but that at the same time no one can
guarantee 100% safety. Please indicate how well society will be able to manage the consequences of the
following situations’. Responses were given on a seven-point scale while one indicated ‘very badly’ and
seven ‘very well’.
Journal of Risk Research 629
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Exploration of the role of PAC in the acceptance of contested infrastructure
To explore whether PAC can explain a share of variance in acceptance that cannot
be explained by perceived risk and beneﬁt alone, we calculated hierarchical linear
regression models for nuclear waste and hazardous waste separately. In a ﬁrst step,
we included RP and BP as predictors in the regression analysis. In a second step,
we entered PAC to examine whether this predictor could explain an additional share
of variance in acceptance. Table 4 displays the results of the two analyses for
nuclear waste and hazardous waste.
Including only RP and BP in the regression models to predict acceptance of a
nuclear waste repository or hazardous waste site reveals that both perceived risks
and beneﬁts signiﬁcantly predict acceptance. Together they explain 35% of variance
in acceptance for the issue of nuclear waste and 26% of variance for the issue of
hazardous waste. As one can expect, RP is a stronger (negative) predictor for accep-
tance of both issues, in particular for the issue of nuclear waste.
PAC has a similar positive effect on acceptance of a nuclear waste repository
and a hazardous waste site. For both waste types, the inclusion of PAC explains a
signiﬁcant additional share of variance in acceptance resulting in higher explained
Table 3. RP, BP, PAC, and acceptance (Acc) for nuclear waste or hazardous waste, mean
values and standard deviations (in parentheses). Scale ranges from one to seven; seven
indicates perception of high risks, high beneﬁts, high adaptive capacity, and high acceptance
N = 300; nnuclear = 147; nhazardous = 153.
RP BP PAC Acc
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Nuclear waste (n = 147) 4.99 (1.52) 3.20 (1.32) 2.38 (1.21) 2.61 (1.87)
Hazardous waste (n = 153) 5.04 (1.16) 3.59 (1.23) 2.76 (1.15) 3.01 (1.74)
Table 4. Hierarchical linear regression models for acceptance of a nuclear waste repository
or a hazardous waste site, respectively N = 300; nnuclear = 147; nhazardous = 153.
Nuclear waste Hazardous waste
B SE B β B SE B β
Step 1
Constant 5.06 0.69 5.14 0.76
Risk perception −0.63 0.09 −0.51*** −0.64 0.11 −0.42***
Beneﬁt perception 0.21 0.11 0.15* 0.30 0.10 0.21**
Step 2
Nuclear waste: ΔR2 = .06***
Hazardous waste: ΔR2 = .05***
Constant 3.70 0.75 3.38 0.92
Risk perception −0.50 0.09 −0.41*** −0.49 0.12 −0.33***
Beneﬁt perception 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.30 0.10 0.21**
Perceived adaptive capacity 0.44 0.11 0.28*** 0.37 0.11 0.24**
Notes: For nuclear waste: Corrected R2 = .35 for Step 1 (p < .001); ΔR2 = .06 for Step 2 (p < .001). For
hazardous waste: Corrected R2 = .26 for Step 1 (p < .001); ΔR2 = .05 for Step 2 (p < .01).
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
*** p < .001.
630 C. Moser et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [Z
ur
ich
 Fa
ch
ho
ch
sc
hu
le]
 at
 01
:31
 13
 M
ay
 20
15
 
variances (nuclear waste: 41%, hazardous waste: 31%). This indicates that PAC is
an important additional factor in decisions regarding acceptance of a nuclear waste
repository or a hazardous waste site. Compared to hazardous waste, perceived bene-
ﬁts seems to be a rather weak predictor for acceptance of a nuclear waste repository,
and its inﬂuence even decreases if PAC is included in the regression.
Mechanisms of adaptive capacity
Visual inspection of Table 5 indicates that participants seem more conﬁdent that future
societies will be able to manage negative consequences of hazardous waste than those
of nuclear waste. Mechanisms enhancing management participants most strongly
agreed upon were individual behavior of inhabitants for the issue of nuclear waste and
technological progress for the issue of hazardous waste. Mechanisms hindering man-
agement that participants most strongly agreed upon were economic crises for the issue
of hazardous waste and political crises for both issues. Compared to participants in the
hazardous waste condition, participants in the nuclear waste conditions agreed less that
well-organized crisis management by public authorities, tð298Þ ¼ 2:89; p\:01;
r ¼ :17 (two-tailed) or technological progress tð294:98Þ ¼ 5:05; p\:001; r ¼ :28
(two-tailed), will provide future societies with abilities to overcome the challenges.
Compared to the participants in the hazardous waste condition, participants in the
nuclear waste condition also rather think that political crises would hinder future socie-
ties to overcome the challenges tð298Þ ¼ 3:23; p\:01; r ¼ :18. All the other group
differences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 5. Mechanisms of adaptive capacity, mean values, and standard deviations (in brack-
ets) for the total sample. Scale ranges from one to seven, one indicating ‘I do not agree at
all’ and seven ‘I agree strongly’ N = 300; nnuclear = 147; nhazardous = 153.
Items
Nuclear
waste
Hazardous
waste t-value
M (SD) M (SD)
Society will probably be able to manage such a challenge
because of the well-organized crisis management of
public authorities
3.22 (1.64) 3.76 (1.55) 2.89**
The crisis will probably be managed because affected
inhabitants will change their habits or move away
4.14 (1.75) 3.95 (1.53) 1.01
Because of technological progress, society will probably
be able to manage such a challenge
3.63 (1.76) 4.59 (1.52) 5.05***
Because of a political crisis, the nation states of today do
not exist anymore, this is why society probably won’t
be able to manage such a challenge
4.36 (1.81) 3.71 (1.64) 3.23**
The knowledge about nuclear waste (hazardous waste)
was lost, this is why society probably won’t be able to
manage such a challenge
3.24 (1.89) 3.03 (1.76) 0.99
Because of an economic crisis, the society lost all its
money and probably won’t be able to manage such a
challenge
3.80 (1.78) 3.69 (1.61) 0.60
**p < .01 (two-tailed).
***p < .001 (two-tailed).
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Discussion
The goal of this study was to examine the role of PAC in the context of individual
decisions regarding contested infrastructure. Research on such decisions predomi-
nantly focuses on the perception of risks and beneﬁts as important aspects for accep-
tance or rejection (e.g. Bord and O’Connor 1992; Drottz-Sjöberg 2010). We aim at
contributing to this line of research by including a future-oriented perspective. In
our view, adaptive capacity, a construct up to now mainly applied in climate
research and ecology, has the potential to contribute to this area. In our study, we
applied the concept of PAC to the issues of nuclear and hazardous wastes. This con-
cept extends the notion of risk and transfers it to the notion of vulnerability.
Our analyses demonstrate that PAC can be considered as a separate psychologi-
cal construct. PAC explains a signiﬁcant additional share of variance in the accep-
tance of a nuclear waste repository or hazardous waste site in addition to RP and
BP. This indicates that individual decision processes about contested infrastructure
projects such as hazardous wastes sites or nuclear waste repositories are not only
characterized by trade-offs between perceived risks and beneﬁts, but that people also
consider how societies today and in the future may be able to manage the potential
negative consequences of such infrastructures.
Of course, we are aware that especially in the case of nuclear waste, a decision
process is not only characterized by risk and beneﬁt considerations; procedural fair-
ness (Krütli et al. 2012), the site selection process in general (Stern and Fineberg
1996; Krütli et al. 2010b), trust (Siegrist, Gutscher, and Earle 2005), and attitudes
toward nuclear power (Sjöberg 2004) play additional important roles. The focus of
this study, however, lies on a contribution to RP research, as this approach still rep-
resents a very dominant line of investigation in social scientiﬁc studies about con-
tested infrastructure.
Our data also indicates what mechanisms participants consider to be drivers of
PAC. The most popular strategy to handle negative consequences of nuclear waste
is individual behavior, e.g. leave a contaminated region (as e.g. in Tschernobyl or
Fukushima). In contrast, for negative consequences of hazardous waste, participants
expect that technological progress will help future societies to manage negative con-
sequences. Most participants do not seem concerned that relevant knowledge about
nuclear waste or hazardous waste could be lost over such timescales. This seems
interesting as studies about permanent markers of deep geological repositories often
pick this problem out as a central theme (e.g. Buser 2010).
Our study yields insights about the role of PAC in decisions about nuclear or
hazardous waste disposal. However, what can we learn for other contested infra-
structure projects? The patterns observed in the regression analyses reveal similar
patterns for both waste types. This indicates that PAC might be a construct that is
relevant for decisions about contested infrastructure on a more general level. How-
ever, we still need to keep in mind that the manipulation check shows that many
participants in the hazardous waste group also considered nuclear waste while
responding to the questions. Furthermore, participants’ responses to the scales mea-
suring RP and BP, PAC, and acceptance are comparable in both waste groups and
even though most of the differences reached statistical signiﬁcance, these effects are
only small (all effect sizes r < .17). Our investigation on mechanisms of adaptive
capacity also indicates that participants distinguish between different infrastructure
projects. To know more about a potential generalization of the concept of PAC to
632 C. Moser et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [Z
ur
ich
 Fa
ch
ho
ch
sc
hu
le]
 at
 01
:31
 13
 M
ay
 20
15
 
other issues, it is therefore necessary to include further contested infrastructure pro-
jects such as deep geothermal, nuclear power plants, gas-ﬁred power plants, dams,
wind power, or CCS.
A critical issue concerns the measurement of PAC. In our study, PAC was mea-
sured as the expected managing abilities of future societies regarding four speciﬁc
threats (transport accident, groundwater contamination, unintentional recovery, and
economic losses), where a negative consequence already occurred. One could argue
that adaptive capacity would also entail the ability to prevent such negative events
from occurring at all. This aspect has not been included in our study. We rather
focused on coping capacity, i.e. the capacity to react to a negative event directly
(Peltonen 2006). For future studies, it would be interesting to examine PAC in a
broader form by examining the expected capacity of societies to prevent negative
events from occurring. In order to capture the dynamic aspect of PAC more pre-
cisely, future studies could also use panel designs where participants are surveyed
more than once. Furthermore, future studies should also investigate if and how indi-
viduals today expect future societies to go through learning processes after a nega-
tive event to prevent further negative events from occurring.
Conclusions
Conceptualizing risks in a decision-theoretic framework (Scholz, Blumer, and Brand
2012) means that we are not just looking at the exposure to losses which emerge
from a risk situation, but that we are at least partly incorporating the capability of an
exposed human system to actively manage them. Therefore, societal learning pro-
cesses as well as organizational and technological development over time are cru-
cial, in particular with respect to long-term risks like the disposal of nuclear or
hazardous waste. In our view, this dynamic perspective should be given more con-
sideration in RP research. From the results of this study, we conclude that PAC plays
an important role in individual decision-making regarding such infrastructures.
In order to better understand decision processes about contested infrastructure,
future research should consider and examine PAC as an important, dynamic factor
to complement the predominant focus on (static) RP. This in particular is important
as decision-making processes about contested infrastructures are ongoing in Switzer-
land (e.g. ﬁnding a site for a nuclear waste repository). Furthermore, not only Swit-
zerland but also other countries face a major energy transition after having decided
to phase out nuclear energy production as a result of the accident at the Japanese
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in March 2011. Moreover, debates about
constructing potentially contested energy infrastructures such as combined cycle
power plants, including CCS, deep geothermal, and hydropower are becoming ever
more widespread.
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Appendix 1. Descriptions of waste types (taken from Moser et al. 2013)
Nuclear waste is a material whose radiation is higher than background radiation (e.g. cosmic
background radiation). Nuclear waste is produced in nuclear power plants, in medicine,
research, and industry. In Switzerland, there is a differentiation between low-level and
high-level waste based on the half-life of radioactive decay. A deep geological repository is a
concept for the long-term storage of nuclear waste, including limited monitoring and retriev-
ability. Such repositories are planned to be built 500–1000 meters below the surface. The
disposal of nuclear waste is a technical challenge and it is possible that containers will start
to leak over time.
Hazardous waste is a material that has to be collected separately and that has to be
disposed off in a controlled manner. These are highly toxic or environmentally harmful
substances that require special technical and organizational measures in their disposal. House-
holds, business, and industry produce hazardous waste. Some examples are: batteries, neon
tubes, heavy metals, mixes of mineral oils, sludges-containing metal, ﬁlter ash from waste
incineration, and so on. Hazardous waste is stored in disposal sites at the surface of old
mines. The disposal of hazardous waste is a technical challenge and it is possible that a
disposal site will start to leak over time.
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